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An Active Safety System for Low-Speed Bus Braking Assistance
Vicent Girbés, Leopoldo Armesto, Juan Dols and Josep Tornero
Abstract—Accidents in which buses or coaches are involved
cause thousands of injuries and fatalities every year. To reduce
their number and severity, the paper describes an Advanced
Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) based on a haptic throttle
pedal and emergency braking. It also proposes a computationally
efficient algorithm with a methodology based on three main
concepts: a simplified but accurate vehicle model; an efficient
collision detection system considering driver’s intention and
pedestrians wandering around the vehicle; and a risk evaluation
system to generate warnings and emergency braking signals.
Finally, the performance of the proposed ADAS is validated
using a driving simulation cabin with a very realistic urban
scenario and original elements from real buses. The results show
a statistically significant improvement in safety, as the number
of collisions and high risk situations are clearly minimized,
reaction time to press the brake pedal is improved and time to
collision increased in emergency situations. Implementation of the
proposed ADAS into city buses would potentially improve safety,
reducing the frequency and severity of accidents with pedestrians.
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization, in its global status report
on road safety 2015 [1], states the need for governments to
ensure that public passenger transportation systems (PTS) are
safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable, as this will lead to
a reduction in the number of traffic accidents and fatalities.
It is a fact that buses and coaches are essential components
of PTS and have socio-economic impact on the promotion of
tourism, energy saving, environmental protection, road safety,
mobility and economy. Indeed, no other mean of collective
passenger transport plays such an important role in all these
areas at the same time. In particular, buses represent 55% of
land PTS in the European Union (EU), while other PTS - rail,
tram and metro - together constitute the remaining 45% [2].
Although bus accident figures are significantly lower than
other means of transport, the severity of their accidents and the
fact that they are massive PTS imply a continuous search for
solutions to improve active and passive safety. This is being
one of the main fields of technological development within the
sector and an absolute priority for all PTS operators. In this
sense, in the last European Commission Framework Programs
and H2020, there have been several projects to classify, analyse
and prevent accidents (TRACE, SafetyNet, DACOTA, LIVE),
while others were intended to design passive and active safety
systems (ADVISORS, HASTE, WATCH-OVER).
From 2004 to 2013 buses and coaches represented around
3% of registered traffic fatalities in the EU [3]. In 2013 about
50% of fatalities in bus or coach accidents occurred in urban
areas. Moreover, almost 30% of those who died in 2013 in
road accidents that involved buses or coaches were pedestrians
and more than 20% were vehicle occupants [3]. In Spain, in
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2013 there were 1816 accidents with victims (mortal or with
injuries) in which a bus was involved [4], where 85% of those
accidents happened in urban areas.
An analysis from police and hospital data regarding safety
in buses (including transfers to/from bus stops) was presented
in [5]. The authors concluded that most injuries occurred on
board, as a result of an abrupt change in vehicle speed (60% in
braking and 25% in acceleration), mainly affecting elderly and
disabled people. This group is shown as the most vulnerable
because it represents more than 50% of accidents, both as
passengers (greater harmfulness when getting off the bus than
when getting on it) and as pedestrians (around bus stops).
Indeed, one of the most common difficulties for drivers to
avoid accidents involving pedestrians is their lack of visibility,
particularly accidents involving children and wheelchairs. For
instance, in the USA from 2003 to 2012, 119 school-age
children died in school-transportation-related crashes while
they were moving around the vehicle [6]. Moreover, most
accidents (crashes and fatalities) happened due to impacts in
the front and right side of the bus.
From CARE database [3], it can be observed that in ac-
cidents where a pedestrian was involved around 22% were
caused by a late driver action, while in more than 32% there
was no action at all. Most of those accidents could have been
avoided by a warning system or a collision avoidance system
with emergency braking. Indeed, a study carried out in the
EC FP6 “Project Cost-benefit assessment and prioritisation
of vehicle safety technologies”, the authors concluded that
front and side collision warning systems can reduce an 8%
the severity and a 12% the risk of collisions of type rear-end
and head-on collisions, as well as vehicle-pedestrian collisions.
On the other hand, Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) systems
could reduce around a 50% the risk of collision on these types
of accidents.
Therefore, active safety systems covering the periphery of
the bus become necessary because mirrors are insufficient since
the location of a person can change quickly and the driver
may be distracted. In this sense, systems to support blind
spots check to warn the driver of pedestrians or objects near
the vehicle have been developed during the last decade [7]–
[9]. Once an obstacle has been detected, Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems (ADAS) normally produce audiovisual
or haptic warnings [10]–[15], with the aim of reducing the
number of accidents and their severity.
In [16], it was stated that the most effective active safety
systems to avoid frontal and lateral crashes are those based
on rear-end, head-on and side collision warning systems. So,
in order to improve traffic safety, these systems try to modify
driver’s behaviour through reactive stimuli to influence their
decision making, for instance by avoiding a rear-end or head-
on accident [17]–[19], helping in lane changing [20] or in lane
keeping manoeuvres [21].
At present, there are already systems using a gas pedal for
active car-following with speed adaptation [22]–[24]. Many
other studies focus on the development of methods to evaluate
and verify the quality, safety and functionality of these sys-
tems, and the analysis of the effects they cause in relation to
security when they are included in the vehicle control chain
[25], [26]. On the other hand, other researchers try to analyse
the adaptation of the driver to the new device, demonstrating
that driving can be improved after a certain time of usage,
making it safer [27]–[29]. See [30] for a detailed survey on
the effect of haptic support systems on driver’s performance.
The main contribution of this paper is the development of
a new algorithm to generate warnings and emergency braking
signals in ADAS, particularly suited to low-speed manoeuvres
in urban environments, mostly in areas of passenger loading
and unloading. In particular, we propose a computationally
efficient algorithm with a methodology based on three main
concepts: a simplified vehicle model; an efficient collision
detection system based on the arc reachable manifold, con-
sidering driver’s intention and pedestrians moving around the
vehicle; and a risk evaluation system to generate warnings
and emergency braking signals. A driving simulator study was
conducted using a realistic urban environment, which shows
the advantages of the proposed active safety system in reducing
the number of collisions and high risk incidents. Driver’s
reaction time is also improved and as a consequence the time
to collision is increased.
The proposed safety system is composed by a pedestrian
detection module based on smart cameras placed in the pe-
riphery of the bus, a haptic feedback device in the throttle
pedal and an emergency braking system. However, we assume
that pedestrians are previously detected and this information is
known, therefore pedestrian detection is out of the scope of this
paper. To the best of authors’ knowledge, there is no system
working on public PTS to avoid collisions with pedestrians at
low speed. In this sense, the implantation of such safety system
into city buses seeks to reduce the frequency and severity of
accidents and injuries involving buses.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section II the pro-
posed methodology for advanced driving systems is described.
Section III describes the experimentation setup implemented
to validate the performance of the ADAS system. Section IV
shows the results obtained from the performed tests. Finally,
a discussion is carried out in Section V and some conclusions
are drawn in Section VI. Compliance with current legislation
and relevant approvals are out of the scope of this paper.
II. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR DRIVER ASSISTANCE
The methodology presented in this paper considers not only
the vehicle behaviour but also pedestrians moving around it.
For that purpose, it is necessary to know driver’s intention,
which is reduced to know the position of throttle and brake
pedals, as well as the steering wheel angle. In addition to this,
sensorization is required to provide information about each
pedestrian detected in the vehicle surroundings: position, speed
and direction of movement relative to the vehicle. As explained
in Sections II-D and II-E, this is accomplished by a set of smart
cameras and electro-mechanical components.
A. Vehicle Model
Let’s assume a vehicle moving on a <2 workspace W and
configuration space CS in <2 × S1. Where, the configuration
space vector q(t) = [x(t), y(t), θ(t)] indicates the Cartesian
position and orientation of the vehicle. In addition to this, let
U be the driver’s space with u(t) = [ua(t), ub(t), α(t)] as
input vector containing the throttle pedal position ua(t), the
brake pedal position ub(t) and the steering wheel angle α(t) ∈
[−αmax, αmax], with αmax as the maximum turning angle. For
simplicity, pedals ranges are normalized, so that ua(t) ∈ [0, 1]
and ub(t) ∈ [0, 1].
Our methodology is inspired by [31], [32], where non-linear
longitudinal dynamics of a vehicle are based on physical laws.
We decompose the components of the vehicle velocity v(t) ∈
[0, vmax] (with vmax as the maximum linear velocity) into two
velocities, one related to acceleration va(t) and another related
to braking vb(t):
v(t) = va(t) + vb(t) (1)
The active safety system is designed to work at low speed,
as explained in Section II-C. In this sense, most of the non-
linearities can be neglected and the non-linear model for the
acceleration component is approximated by a linearised first-














where d(s) ≡ L[d(t)] is the travelled distance, va(s) ≡
L[va(t)] and ua(s) ≡ L[ua(t)], being L the Laplace transform.
In order to validate the performance of the simplified
model, we have obtained velocity data from a real urban bus
(TEMPUS bus manufactured by Castrosua S.A.), accelerating
at full throttle during 15 seconds. The fitting performance of
the simplified model to the data is R2 = 0.973 and the mean
squared error MSE = 0.015 m/s, while the best fitting we
could find using longitudinal dynamics described in [31] and
Pacejka’s tire model [32] is R2 = 0.976 with MSE = 0.012
m/s. In addition to this, to simulate 15 seconds using a Matlab-
Simulink implementation with ODE45 solver and variable
simulation step, the computation time is tproc = 0.153 s on
average for the simplified first-order model. Whilst for the
complex model it is tproc=13.191 s, around 86 times slower.
The computer used in the simulation is based on Ubuntu 14.04
and has the following technical specifications: CPU Intel Core
i7-2670QM 2.20GHz, with 8GB DDR3 1333 MHz.
On the other hand, the model relating the effective braking
speed vb(s) ≡ L[vb(t)] with the deceleration ab(s) ≡ L[ab(t)]







The braking deceleration ab(t) mainly depends on brake
pedal position ub(t), but also on the current vehicle velocity
v(t), as shown in Figure 1. After some tests, we detected a
saturation of the braking force for values of ub(t) close to the
































Figure 1. Deceleration surface of the second order polinomial model. Blue
dots are the values of ab(t) measured during the braking calibration tests.
ub(t) and v(t) are normalized brake position and vehicle speed, respectively,
which are used to approximate the value of ab(t) using Equation 4.
overall braking deceleration1 and brake pedal position slightly
non-linear. We have determined that a quadratic model as in
(4) is able to provide a good fitting performance. Using the
Least Squares method and real data, we obtained a fitting of
R2 =0.988 with MSE=0.001 m/s2 between these variables,
although other approximations might be valid as well, for
instance using neural networks.
ab(t)≈k0+k1v(t)+k2ub(t)+k3v2(t)+k4u2b(t)+k5v(t)ub(t) (4)
It is interesting to remark that using the same Pacejka’s
complex model for the braking deceleration [32], we per-
formed parameters identification in order to adjust the model
as close to real data as possible. The best fitting performance
that we got was R2 = 0.926 and MSE = 0.065 m/s2. We
found that this dynamic model differs from the real behaviour
of the vehicle mostly at low speeds and with low values
of braking torque, which makes more difficult to find an
appropriate parameter fitting. As a conclusion, our approach
is more efficient computationally because the braking value
is obtained directly from a polynomial equation, without the
need to compute the dynamic equations of the complex model.
B. Collision Detection
An Arc Reachable Manifold [33] is a two-dimensional
manifold in <2×S1. Let ARMv be the driver’s configura-
tion space (blue arrow in Figure 2), obtained from a non-
holonomic standard car-like kinematic model (i.e. type (1,1) in
[34], which is kinematically equivalent to Ackermann steering
model). Without loss of generality, ARMv has its center at
(xv, yv) with xv = 0, yv = sign(α(t)) ·Rv(t) and radius
Rv(t)=
∣∣∣ Ltan(α(t)) ∣∣∣, being α(t) the vehicle steering wheel angle
and L the wheelbase, i.e. the distance between vehicle’s front
and rear wheels axles.
Now, let’s define l as the distance from the rear axle to the
front of the vehicle and w as the vehicle width assuming a
rectangular footprint. In order to abstract pedestrians’ shape,
vehicle footprint is usually inflated with the estimated radius of
the circle circumscribing a pedestrian Rp (see Figure 2). Thus,
following the ideas of [35], we can obtain a parametrized rect-
1Measured as the ratio between the time necessary to stop the vehicle and














Figure 2. Example of collision detection, where COARM and CUARM
spaces are computed from nearest pedestrian position using vehicle’s inflated
footprint, while collision points CObARM,v and CU
b
ARM,v are computed
taking into account the manifold ARMv from driver’s inputs.
angular shaped vehicle (chequered cyan rectangle in Figure 2):
xv(λ) =
{
dY tanλ if tanλ< dXdY and λ<
π
2







−dY if tanλ< dXdY and λ<
π
2
dY if tanλ>− dXdY and λ>
π
2













with λ ∈ [0, π], being dX = l + Rp and dY = w/2 +
Rp. For simplicity, we only consider the front part of the bus
shape because the vehicle is moving forward. However, rear
part would be treated in a similar way when moving backward.
There exists a configuration obstacle ARM (COARM ) that
defines the region at which the vehicle collides with objects by
describing an arc (chequered black region in Figure 2). Indeed,
the configuration obstacle for all pedestrians is COARM =
∪iCOARM,i, where COARM,i denotes the configuration ob-
stacle for the i-th pedestrian. From now on, we remove sub-
index i to keep notation clearer, restricting ourselves to one
single pedestrian case, although computations must be carried
out for each pedestrian.




points for a given pedestrian position {xp, yp}, being CObARM
the boundary of COARM . This boundary can be analytically
computed for any shape [35]:
xbCOARM (λ) = c · (xp + xv(λ)) (7)
ybCOARM (λ) = c · (yp − yv(λ)) (8)











Instead of considering the whole parametrized CObARM
for any arbitrary shape, only mid and end points of each
segment of the rectangular shape are considered. This re-
duces the computation of shape abstraction to a total of 7









, λ3 = π/2,








and λ6 = π. Furthermore, we approximate an arc segment for
every triple of points related to each segment of the rectangle,
having a total of 3 arcs defining an approximation of CObARM :
CObARM ≈ COARM,L ∪ COARM,F ∪ COARM,R (9)
where COARM,L denotes configuration obstacle ARM for left-




















d min d max 
d max 
d CO 
d CU d stop d safety 
d min d max d CO 
d CO 
Figure 3. Collision risk evaluation and involved variables. The example is
particularized for a pedestrian distance dCO , although it is possible to analyse
c(t) and e(t) by moving the pedestrian along the distance axis d.
the front-side (using points with λ2 to λ4) and COARM,R to
the right-side (using points with λ4 to λ6). As a consequence,
CObARM becomes a piece-wise function formed by 3 arc
segments, which are easier to deal with than computing the
analytical locci as in (7)-(8).
Now, let’s define CObARM,v = CO
b
ARM ∩ARMv as the
manifold in <2×S1 in which vehicle configurations are in
collision with pedestrians (yellow stars in Figure 2). This
manifold is indeed computed from geometric relations between
arc segments, so for every segment of the vehicle shape, we
compute the intersection between the arc segment defined by
ARMv and the approximation of CObARM using (9). If such
intersection point exists and belongs to both arc segments, it
is considered as a candidate collision point. The point with
the minimum distance (arc-length to reach that point from
the origin) is the most critical one and, thus, the one to be




being C(t) the subset of candidate collision points and δi(t)
their arc angle.
Due to vehicle dynamics, considering COARM,v to take
decisions is in general not enough. In this sense, there exists
an unsafe manifold CUARM , which defines the region for
inevitably collisions due to vehicle dynamics [33] (stripped
black region in Figure 2). Indeed, COARM ⊂ CUARM , which
contains additional vehicle configurations that are unsafe,
because of the distance needed to stop the vehicle in case of
emergency braking. Computing CUARM for a general obstacle
avoidance problem is complex as it requires to compute
four additional boundary points for every boundary point
of COARM [33]. Fortunately, in ADAS applications, only
CU bARM,v = CU
b
ARM ∩ ARMv is of interest (red star in
Figure 2), being CU bARM the boundary of CUARM . As can be
seen in Figure 3, the distance of CU bARM,v can be computed by
subtracting to dCO(t) the minimum distance to stop dmin(t):
dCU (t) = dCO(t)− dmin(t) (11)
where dmin(t) will be detailed thereinafter.
Table I shows the algorithm performance to compute the
COARM using our approach (arc-based) and the approach
proposed in [35] (segment-based). If we assume that there are 3
shape sides (left, front, right), the number of points to compute
the COARM is N = 3 ·2n+1, being n the number of times
we split each vehicle shape side in a half. In our approach,
since three points per side are considered, there is a fixed
computational time with less significant error (case n = 1).
To obtain the accuracy achieved in our approach, the method
proposed in [35] takes roughly twice to compute with n = 32.
Processing times are based on Matlab implementations using
the same computer as in Section II-A.
Table I. COARM COMPUTATION: SEGMENT-BASED VS. ARC-BASED
n 0 1 2 3 4
segment- tproc [ms] 0.348 0.371 0.516 0.725 1.157
based eCO [mm] 51.74 22.31 8.03 0.93 0.4
arc- tproc [ms] − 0.313 − − −
based eCO [mm] − 1.62 − − −
C. Risk Evaluation
In order to assist the speed control of the vehicles we












being dmin(t) and dmax(t) distance thresholds that define a
spatial window ∆d(t) where the system is active:
∆d(t) = dmax(t)− dmin(t) (13)
This design parameter represents the anticipation distance
at which the vehicle should reduce its speed before reaching
the “inevitable collision” distance dmin(t). Therefore, high
values of ∆d(t) imply conservative solutions with anticipated
warning, so the ADAS system becomes active sooner. On the
contrary, low ∆d(t) values mean more aggressive solutions
with sharper transition from warning to braking. As ∆d(t) is
a design parameter, one can typically set it to a constant value
or define an expression dependent on the vehicle velocity.
Figure 3 shows the definition of variables related to the
computation of the risk factor for a frontal collision. The
same concepts apply to any arbitrary ARM, where distances
are indeed arc-lengths. A graphical example of Equation (12)
is depicted in Figure 3, showing the range where the system
is active: 1) if c(t) = 0 there is no risk of collision; 2)
if c(t) ∈]0, 1[ the system is not in collision, but there is a
potential risk and thus warning must be activated; 3) if c(t) = 1
there is a maximum risk of collision and therefore emergency
braking must be applied to stop the vehicle.
On the one hand, our ADAS system generates a warning
signal w(t) based on the risk factor c(t), conditioned to





if ua(t) > 0 or v(t) > 0
otherwise (14)
On the other hand, if c(t) = 1 an imminent collision is
detected and then an emergency braking must be applied. In
2Error distance eCO is computed as the difference between dCO and the
exact model of COARM when n→∞.
3When the driver stops pressing the accelerator pedal, we assume that he/she
is aware of the danger and hence the warning signal is deactivated.
such cases, an emergency signal e(t) is enabled in order to
stop the vehicle, although conditioned to its speed. In fact, if
the velocity is higher than a given threshold ve,max=30 km/h,






if c(t) = 1 and 0 < v(t) < ve,max
otherwise (15)
The minimum stop distance dstop(t) is dynamically com-
puted to guarantee that the vehicle can stop by applying the
maximum deceleration ab,max(t):
dstop(t) = 0.5 · v(t)2/ab,max(t) (16)
where ab,max(t) is obtained from (4) for ub(t) = 1.
In order to introduce an additional safety factor, we define:
dmin(t) = dsafety + dstop(t) (17)
where dsafety is a safety distance where to theoretically stop
the vehicle with respect to an object.
D. Haptic Feedback Device
Figure 4 shows a prototype of the haptic throttle used in
the experimentation, which is based on a real bus pedal (MCS
962 000 series). The system incorporates a motorized four-bar
mechanism for blocking and ejecting the pedal by a lever when










Figure 4. Haptic throttle with blocking lever based on a real bus pedal.
The haptic throttle pedal provides position feedback rather
than force feedback. The design of the safety system causes
a kickback feeling in the driver when the warning signal is
enabled, which works as a warning, not as a guidance aid.
The lever is calibrated so that its angular position is linearly
dependent on the warning signal w(t) and the risk factor c(t).
Although the haptic feedback in the throttle is continuous from
non-blocking position to full blocking, in order to avoid a
noisy behaviour in the lever positioning, we have introduced
hysteresis discretizing the range into 11 values, from 0% to
100% of blocking. In the non-blocking position the driver can
freely push the pedal to the maximum position, while in the
blocking position the driver must apply a force greater than
58 N on the throttle pedal to move the mechanism5.
4The system is designed like this in order to be consistent with current
legislation for brake assist systems: Regulation UN/ECE No 13-H.
5This information has been obtained experimentally in a throttle pedal with
length 0.2 m, but it is a design parameter and might vary depending on the
mechanical solution adopted.
Algorithm 1 Warning and Braking Assistance
Require: u(t), v(t), {xp, yp}, H
1: Predict vehicle path ARMv , using (1)-(4) and horizon H .
2: Compute collision risk threshold distances using (16)-(17).
3: Set tC = t.
4: while convergence do
5: Update pedestrian predicted position at time tC , {x′p, y′p} =
f(xp, yp, tC).
6: Compute 7 boundary points of COARM corresponding to mid
and end points for each segment of the vehicle rectangular
shape using (7)-(8).
7: Compute 3 arc segments using each of the mid and end points
previously computed.
8: Determine whether or not the vehicle path is in collision
with such arc segments and compute distance to obstacle-
collision, dCO(t) using (10)-(11). If not collision is detected,
then dCO(t) is the arc length of ARMv .
9: Find tC at which the distance travelled by the vehicle in
ARMv equals to dCO(t).
10: end while
11: Compute collision risk using (12).
12: Compute warning and emergency braking using (14) and (15).
13: return w(t) and e(t).
It is worth mentioning that the haptic throttle pedal has not
been designed to ensure the absence of collisions, but as a
warning system. When the lever tries to expel driver’s foot,
he/she feels a force which is reasonably enough to warn, but at
the same time, one can always push it back on purpose easily
(if needed). Thus, the aim is to warn the driver to improve
its reaction time for braking, while making the driver feel in
control of the vehicle in collision-free situations. However, the
haptic pedal is not enough to avoid a collision when e(t) = 1,
so a bus specific signal is activated, which causes a maximum
deceleration by applying full braking force to the wheels.
E. Complete Active Safety System
As stated in Section I, the complete ADAS proposed in this
paper consists of a pedestrian detection module together with
a braking assistance system with haptic feedback. The aim of
this active safety system is to warn the driver and, if necessary,
to stop the vehicle in dangerous manoeuvres at low speed.
The pedestrian detection system uses a set of smart cameras
to detect people wandering in the vehicle surroundings. Cam-
eras are placed in front upper part of the bus (left, center and
right) pointing downwards, covering the periphery of the bus
from an overhead view, and an additional camera pointing to
the front, able to detect pedestrians from a greater distance.
To know driver’s intention the ADAS requires additional
sensing such as a potentiometer in the steering column and
potentiometers on throttle and brake pedals. Further details on
implemented pedestrian detection system can be found in [36].
In this contribution, let’s assume that motions {x′p, y′p} =
f(xp, yp, t) can be predicted for every pedestrian from a smart
camera. Algorithm 1 shows an iterative procedure to determine
collision risk factor c(t), Equation (12), for a given prediction
horizon H and for each moving pedestrian. The processing
time of a C++ implementation of the proposed algorithm is
tproc = 0.15±0.05 ms, using the same PC as in Section II-A.
Figure 5. Driving simulation cabin with projection system composed by 3
projectors and a semicircular screen.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A driving simulation cabin was used as a tool to evaluate
the performance of the proposed ADAS. Several experiments
have been carried out in order to validate the behaviour of the
braking assistance system with haptic feedback on a simulated
environment. As shown in Figure 5, the simulation platform
includes the following devices: a driving cabin with a seat, a
steering wheel, pedals and a gearshift; and a projection system
composed by three synchronised video projectors for environ-
mental simulation onto a semicircular screen. Regarding the
simulation engine, it is based on PhysX SDK (version 3.3.1)
for computation of rigid body dynamics and collisions, while
OGRE (version 1.8.1) is used as graphics engine for rendering
scenarios and visualization.
The vehicle type used for experimentation is a bus with the
following parameters: mass m = 10630 kg (tare or unladen
weight), length l = 7 m, width w = 2.6 m, axles distance
L= 6 m and maximum turning angle αmax =π/4 rad. After
identification using the step response method, we obtained a
first-order model as in (2), with K = 16.81, τ = 12.47 s and
τd = 0.1 s. On the other hand, the braking model in (4) was
approximated using the following values: k0 =0, k1 =−0.03,
k2 = −5.97, k3 = 4.41 · 10−4, k4 = 1.79 and k5 = 0, with a
maximum deceleration of ab,max≈−4.5 m/s2.
Unless specified otherwise, in all tests the parameters for
the ADAS were set to the following values: safety distance
dsafety=1 m and ∆d=10 m, with Rp=0.3 m as a constant
radius to define pedestrians shape.
A. Emergency braking: mass influence
The aim of this experiment is to evaluate the robustness of
the emergency braking system against modelling errors, for
different bus loads (assuming a capacity of 58 passengers and
approximately 70 kg per passenger): m = 11000 kg (empty,
with kerb weight), m=13000 kg (half loaded) and m=15000
kg (full loaded). In this test, the pedestrian is placed initially
at a distance of dCO = 40 m far from the bus. Then the
driver starts pressing the throttle and the vehicle speeds up
and moves straight forward against the obstacle. The haptic
warning is disabled to evaluate only the emergency braking
effect. Indirectly, we also want to show how dsafety can be
obtained to guarantee the absence of collision even when the
vehicle model has uncertainties.
B. Haptic warning: distance range influence
In order to evaluate the influence of the distance range ∆d
in which the warning is active, we performed a series of 7
tests varying from ∆d= 0 m to ∆d= 30 m, with increments
of 5 m. Initially, the pedestrian was placed at dCO = 40 m,
the bus was half loaded m=13000 kg and the safety distance
was set to dsafety=1 m. The driver had to proceed as in the
previous experiment, but in this case reacting as soon as he
felt the haptic feedback in the throttle. This experiment also
shows how to get an appropriate value of ∆d, justifying the
value used in the experimentation carried out in Section IV-D.
C. Haptic warning: driving behaviour influence
Through this experimentation, we evaluate the influence
of the haptic feedback under different driving behaviours or
styles, from expected to aggressive. As in the previous test,
the vehicle moves forward against a static pedestrian placed
at dCO = 14 m far from the front of the bus. The driver was
addressed to brake the vehicle when considered necessary. In
the expected behaviour the driver reacted as soon as he felt
the haptic feedback. In the second attempt, the subject was
addressed to drive in a more aggressive way, without taking
the haptic warning into account. In this experiment the bus
was also half loaded m=13000 kg.
D. Benchmarking evaluation
The last set of experiments involved 20 different drivers (19
males and 1 female with ages between 18 and 55, mean age
30± 5.6), each one driving for about half an hour around an
urban scenario. A specific area of the city of Valencia (Spain)
has been modelled, reproducing very realistic driving condi-
tions including traffic and pedestrian logic. Even though users
were not expert bus drivers, all of them had driving licence
(experience of 8 ± 3.4 years in average) and used to drive
their car frequently. Before starting, the subjects experienced
the driving simulator for as long as they needed, in order to
get used to it and to the urban circuit. The experimentation
consisted of taking 4 loops to a circuit composed by 6 bus
stops. The bus route was more than 2.2 km long, so each
subject drove for about 9 km and did 24 bus stops.
During the test, drivers were addressed to drive normally
around the city, following a given path and stopping at all
bus stops. When the vehicle was approaching or leaving a
bus stop, randomly a pedestrian showed up walking in front
of the bus. Drivers did not know when or where pedestrians
showed up. In order to counterbalance the cases with/without
the safety system active, among all risky situations, half the
times the haptic feedback and the emergency braking were
disabled, always randomly. Furthermore, in order to avoid a
“learning effect” produced by the drivers getting used to the
experiment, pedestrians appeared in a random pattern before
or after a bus stop, in both cases or in none of them. Besides,
risky situations were designed so that it was possible to stop
the vehicle in time. For instance, pedestrians did not show up
if the vehicle was moving too fast in an approach manoeuvre



















Figure 6. Phase diagram of distance dCO(t) versus velocity v(t) for different
values of vehicle mass m.
because the accident would be unavoidable. On the other hand,
to avoid that participants were able to predict a pedestrian
walking in front of the bus, those pedestrians used specifically
in risky situations were transparent and became visible when
the incident was produced. Hence, situations in which the
driver is distracted or his view is obstructed were reproduced.
The aim of such experiment was to compare the perfor-
mance when the safety system was enabled against cases in
which it was disabled. Several aspects will be analysed in
Section IV-D, such as percentages of low, medium, high risk
situations and collisions, as well as driver’s reaction time in
warning situations and time to collision. In the experimenta-
tion, we consider the following risk conditions:
• Low: when dmin < dCO ≤ dmax.
• Medium: when dsafety < dCO ≤ dmin.
• High: when 0.1m < dCO ≤ dsafety and v > 1.5 m/s.
• Collision: when dCO ≤ 0.1m and v > 0.6 m/s.
On the other hand, in order to measure driver’s time of
reaction tR, we compute the delay between the instant when
the haptic feedback starts warning through the blocking lever
and the instant when the driver presses the brake at least a
10% of its range. Time to collision tC is computed recursively,
as explained in Algorithm 1. For this analysis, we distinguish
between situations where the bus slows down to stop (approach
manoeuvres), from those in which the bus starts its movement
(departure manoeuvres). It must be remarked that the collision
risk evaluation system is computed in any case, with the ADAS
enabled or disabled, in order to compare the performance.
IV. RESULTS
A. Emergency braking: mass influence
This set of tests shows the influence of bus mass in an
emergency braking and how dsafety can be set to guarantee
no collision even with modelling errors. In this experiment
we used a model of the bus half loaded, considering a mass of
m=13000 kg. As the safety distance was set to dsafety=1 m,
the vehicle should stop at such distance far from the obstacle
(dashed blue line in Figure 6). However, if the model is not
accurate enough, the vehicle does not behave as expected,
braking before or after it should (green and dotted red lines
in Figure 6, respectively). In the worst case scenario, we
would be using a model of the bus completely empty for the
collision detection, when in fact it would be full. This would
imply braking too late in some situations and therefore adding
an extra safety distance is necessary to avoid crashes. Such
distance dsafety should be at least the difference between the


























Figure 7. Mean Normalized Total Jerk MNTJ and Warning-Emergency
Ratio WER for different values of ∆d.
distance travelled by the vehicle (moving approximately at the
maximum speed at which the emergency braking works) when
it is full loaded and when it is with the same load as the model
used in the collision detection.
B. Haptic warning: distance influence
In this experimentation, the influence of the variation in
distance ∆d is evaluated. To do so, we have used the following
longitudinal metrics: Mean Normalized Total Jerk (MNTJ)
and Warning-Emergency Ratio (WER).
On the one hand, MNTJ takes into account changes in









being ax,i the longitudinal acceleration.
On the other hand, WER considers the ratio between the
distance travelled in a warning situation dwarning and the






Figure 7 shows the results obtained for different values of
∆d. It can be observed that the shorter ∆d is the higher the
MNTJ and the sharper the emergency braking. In the limit of
∆d=0 m, there is no warning at all as WER=0 and therefore
there is no transition between a non-collision situation and an
emergency situation. We consider that a WER ≈ 1 is good,
because lower values imply more aggressive safety actions
without warning, while values too big are annoying to the
driver as the system starts working when the pedestrian is still
too far away. In this sense, we chose ∆d = 10 m for the
experimentation carried out in Section IV-D.
C. Haptic warning: driving behaviour influence
Figure 8 shows two cases representing different driver’s
behaviour: expected and aggressive. In Figure 8(a), in the first
case (red line) the driver intentionally does not react when the
blocking lever tries to eject the throttle so he/she keeps pressing
it, let’s define that as aggressive driving. The second situation
(dashed blue line) is an expected behaviour that happens when
the driver reacts immediately releasing completely the throttle
after feeling some force in the pedal. Obviously, between this










(a) Throttle position vs. Inverted warning signal




























































Figure 8. Experiments with two opposite driver’s reaction to the haptic feed-
back device: aggressive (red) and expected (dashed blue). Black line represents
the allowed range to press the gas pedal, computed as b(t)=1−w(t). In both
cases the vehicle moves forward against an obstacle placed at dCO = 14 m.
two extreme situations there is a range of behaviours depending
on driver’s time of reaction after feeling the haptic feedback.
On the other hand, in Figures 8(b) and 8(c) longitudinal
acceleration and jerk are depicted, respectively. In the instant
t ≈ 8 s is when the driver stops pressing the throttle in
the expected behaviour (dashed blue line), which implies a
slight negative deceleration before the emergency braking is
produced at t≈9 s. This behaviour implies that the maximum
jerk suffered by the vehicle is lower and therefore more
comfortable than the one produced by a more aggressive
driving (red line). It is interesting to remark the equivalence
between aggressive driving and a more conservative driving
without haptic warning, i.e. with ∆d= 0 m. In fact, in both
situations the emergency braking is applied directly without
the driver reacting previously.
Finally, Figure 8(d) depicts the phase diagram of the pro-
posed deceleration control law in order to analyse the perfor-
mance of the safety system under each driver behaviour. The
abscissa axis represents vehicle velocity, while the ordinate
axis represents the distance of the vehicle to collide (without
taking into account the length of the bus, since distances are
measured from its front part). Initially, the pedestrian is placed
at dCO = 14 m far from the vehicle. Then the driver starts
pressing the throttle and the vehicle speeds up. When the
obstacle is at dCO<dmax the blocking system becomes active
and ejects the throttle pedal. Finally, as soon as dCO<dmin an
emergency braking is applied guaranteeing that when the bus
is fully stopped the pedestrian is at a distance around dsafety
far from the front part of the vehicle. It can be seen that
the proposed control law cancels out driver actions and safely
stops the vehicle before crashing in all considered situations.
Indeed the safety system is effective even in cases of aggressive
driving or with late reactions.
D. Benchmarking evaluation
The experimentation carried out produced an amount of
606 risky situations, half of the incidents with the system
disabled and the other half with it enabled. When the system
was disabled there was a 59.08% of low risk cases, while the
remaining 40.92% of incidents had medium risk (27.06%),
high risk (13.2%), or even collisions (0.66%). On the contrary,
when the system was enabled, even though the proportions
were similar in terms of low risk cases with a 60.73%, in
the remainder there were no collisions and the high risk
situations were reduced to a mere 3.63%. This phenomena
can be attributed to the emergency braking, which is able to
stop autonomously the vehicle in time in situations in which
the driver would not be fast enough.
In order to highlight the benefits provided by the warning
system, we will evaluate the driver’s reaction time tR in
low risk cases. In our experimentation, the time of reaction
was measured as the delay between the instant in which a
pedestrian appears and the time instant when the driver presses
the brake pedal. Empirically we obtained that tR varies from
0.3 s to 1.2 s. We discarded values of tR < 0.3 s because
either the driver was already pressing the brake pedal or we
consider that driver’s intention was to brake before even seeing
any potential collision.
In Table II we analyse the incidents when the vehicle is
approaching the bus stop (STOP) and when it is departing
(START). In both cases we compare the results when the safety
haptic system is disabled (OFF) and when it is enabled (ON).
It can be seen that the haptic feedback does not affect much the
results in approach manoeuvres, as both populations are not
very different, although the time of reaction is slightly faster
when the system is enabled (ON). Indeed, when the vehicle is
approaching to a bus stop and an emergency situation occurs,
the average reaction time is tR≈0.59 s if the haptic feedback
is OFF and tR ≈ 0.54 s when it is ON. In both cases the
standard deviation is very similar σ≈0.25 s.
Table II. REACTION TIME tR IN APPROACH (STOP) AND DEPARTURE
(START) MANOEUVRES, WITH HAPTIC THROTTLE AND EMERGENCY
BRAKING DISABLED (OFF) AND ENABLED (ON).
STOP START
OFF 0.5927± 0.2667 s 0.7026± 0.1875 s
ON 0.5423± 0.2434 s 0.5887± 0.1805 s
On the other hand, when the vehicle departs from a bus stop
and a potential collision is detected the average reaction time
is tR ≈ 0.7 s when the system is disabled (OFF), while it is
tR≈0.59 s when it is enabled (ON). Once more, the standard
deviation is very similar in both cases σ ≈ 0.18 s. So, the
haptic warning helps the driver be approximately 17% faster
in pressing the brake in situations with low risk of collision.
Now, in order to check the validity of results we have
performed one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to evaluate
the factor haptic feedback. The purpose is to determine whether
data from the groups (levels) of the factor haptic feedback,
which are OFF and ON, have a common mean or, on the
contrary are significantly different. From ANOVA tests we
get that when the vehicle approaches the bus stop the p-
value is p = 0.382. So, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
at the 0.05 significance level. Hence we conclude that the
observed differences are not statistically significant. So the
haptic feedback does not improve safety when the vehicle
approaches the bus stop. On the other hand, in departure
manoeuvres after ANOVA analysis we get that p=1.227·10−7.
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and can conclude
that both groups of data are statistically different with 5% of
significance. Hence, the haptic feedback reduces driver’s time
of reaction tR in departure manoeuvres.
In addition to this, the proportion of low and medium risk
incidents is higher when the safety warning is enabled. Since
the haptic feedback reduces the reaction time, the expected
mean velocity in these situations is also reduced. Mean velocity
is measured from the instant when the risk is detected to the
instant in which it disappears, because either the vehicle stops
or speed is reduced so that there is no risk any more. We
obtained, from these experiments, a mean velocity value of
v̄= 2.8 m/s when the system is enabled compared to v̄= 4.5
m/s when the system is disabled in those situations. Therefore,
we can imply that safety is also improved as the severity in case
of collision is reduced by reducing the speed of the vehicle.
Finally, we analyse the time to collision tC in emergency
situations (corresponding to cases of medium risk, high risk or
collision) in order to highlight the benefits of the autonomous
braking. After analysing the results, it can be concluded that
the time to collision when the safety system is enabled (ON)
is bigger (tC = 0.8648 ± 0.4268 s) than when it is disabled
(OFF) (tC = 0.7086 ± 0.3309 s). The standard deviation has
also been reduced considerably. Furthermore, in the obtained
results there are no cases with tC<0.2 s with the emergency
braking enabled. This means that the use of the proposed
system increases safety as long as the probability distribution
of the time to collision has been moved away from tC =0 s.
However, to prove the validity of the results we have
performed an ANOVA test. The results imply that both popula-
tions, when the factor emergency braking takes its two possible
levels OFF/ON, are statistically different with a significance
of 5%, as the statistic p= 0.001. Therefore, we state that the
observed improvements in the time to collision are due to the
usage of the proposed active safety system.
V. DISCUSSION
As stated in Section I, the main contribution of this paper is
the development and testing of a new ADAS to help bus drivers
in low-speed manoeuvres in urban environments, mostly in
areas of passenger loading and unloading. The novelty lies in
the fact that, after doing our own research and among all the
papers cited in the extensive survey carried out by Petermeijer
et.al. in [30], we did not find any approach using a haptic
throttle pedal in order to avoid crashes with pedestrians.
Following the classification developed in [30], we consider
that the proposed safety system for bus braking assistance
working at low speed to avoid collisions with pedestrians could
be described as a warning system with automatic emergency
braking (function level), intended for collision avoidance and
speed adaptation at a manoeuvring level (task level), that uses
a haptic throttle (channel level) applying a counterforce to
communicate with the driver (signal level).
In [25]–[28], authors use active gas pedals applying a
counterforce when the speed limit is exceeded. This is very
similar to what is done in the present paper, although applied to
“safe speed and safe distance” (SASPENCE). In this sense, our
findings are consistent and also show a statistically significant
reduction in driver’s reaction time when the haptic warning is
enabled. Furthermore, it has been also shown that a haptic
throttle pedal can help to reduce the number of high risk
incidents and collisions.
In other works, haptic warnings are used to avoid rear-
end collisions with vehicles using vibro-tactile and/or audio-
visual feedback [17]–[19]. Similar works were carried out
for collision avoidance problems using a haptic seat [13], a
haptic steering wheel [14] or auditory feedback and a haptic
pedal [22], [25]. However, only two studies have been found
regarding collision avoidance with pedestrians. They use either
auditory and tactile feedback [11] or haptic steering guidance
[12]. But, none of them evaluates the effect of an active
gas pedal as a warning to reduce the risk of collision with
pedestrians. Therefore, our approach is a new contribution in
the field as there are no previous solutions to this problem.
As in most of the mentioned papers, our findings prove
that the active throttle with haptic feedback reduces driver’s
reaction time, so the average speed is slowed and the time
to collision increased, which indirectly decreased the number
of medium and high risk situations in which an emergency
braking is necessary. Moreover, we have also shown that using
haptic warnings reduce the abruptness when braking and there-
fore injuries occurred on board are decreased. On the other
hand, in medium or high risk incidents the emergency braking
is an extra safety device able to reduce the speed automatically
when the driver does not react in time, which helps to reduce
the number of crashes. Therefore, the improvement in safety
is due to the combination of both parts, although it can be
concluded that the automatic emergency braking is the ultimate
responsible for reducing the number of accidents.
Among the limitations of the proposed method, we think that
the simplified model of the vehicle (acceleration and braking)
is very useful to check for collisions very quickly. However, as
it is only valid for a vehicle and a kind of surface, the system
could be improved by identifying models for different masses
(loads), contact surfaces, among other variants.
The implementation of the proposed active safety system
into city buses is not straightforward, requiring compliance
with current legislation and relevant approvals. Regulations
UN/ECE 13 and UN/ECE 131 affect vehicle’s emergency brak-
ing, which might imply its integration within the Electronic
Braking System (EBS). Regarding the haptic throttle pedal,
the system does not affect the original vehicle configuration.
Besides, as far as we know there is no-regulation regarding the
maximum force that can be applied to the gas pedal, it only
depends on the bus manufacturer. All these regulation aspects
have been taken into account during the development of our
preliminary pedestrian detection and emergency brake system
in the context of the SAFEBUS project, see [36] for further
details. As a result of the project we were able to perform
some preliminary tests using a real bus, which constituted a
proof of concept for the proposed systems in this paper.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A new advanced outdoor safety system for buses in urban
environments at low speeds has been introduced and tested.
The proposed approach is based on a computationally efficient
algorithm that uses a simplified model of vehicle dynamics.
This model has been proven to be applicable to collision
detection with similar performance to more complex models,
but with less processing load. The algorithm considers driver’s
intention, vehicle shape and dynamics in order to evaluate the
risk of collision with pedestrians moving around the vehicle.
Moreover, a haptic feedback device has been developed to
warn the driver in case of risk of collision, which consists
of an active throttle pedal with a blocking mechanism. Under
imminent collision conditions, the safety system sends an
electric signal to enable the emergency braking system.
In the article, we have analysed the influence of the main
parameters affecting the proposed method. Besides, the ef-
fectiveness of the developed safety system has been tested
through some experiments carried out using a real prototype
of the haptic throttle in a driving simulator. These experiments
demonstrate that the haptic feedback in the throttle pedal is
able to warn and interact with the driver when a dangerous
manoeuvre happens, which reduces the reaction time and
the number of situations in which the emergency braking
system gets active. If a dangerous manoeuvre persists, the
emergency braking guarantees collision-free situations, which
is an improvement in safety.
As further work, we aim to validate the complete safety
system in a real scenario, using an urban transport bus. Thus,
the effectiveness of the haptic feedback could be analysed in
depth with professional bus drivers. Moreover, we also want
to enhance the haptic warning using audio-visual feedback
devices, analysing their effects individually and together.
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The authors wish to thank José Luı́s Sánchez Carrascosa for his
commitment to the project. Finally, thanks to Ana Isabel Sánchez
Galdón for her valuable help regarding ANOVA analysis.
REFERENCES
[1] WHO, “Global status report on road safety 2015,” World Health
Organization, Tech. Rep., 2015.
[2] ASCABUS, “El sector carrocero de autobuses y autocares y el trans-
porte de viajeros en cifras,” Asociación Española de Carroceros de
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